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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAE ADAMSON, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs- Appellate Case No. 20010516-CA 
RANAE ADAMSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner") submits the following as his brief in 
the above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which is the Order Denying 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce ("Order Denying Petition to Modify"), is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah 
Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below is a proceeding to modify a decree of divorce, and the order 
appealed from is the Order Denying Petition to Modify. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issue is presented on appeal: For purposes of modifying Respondent's 
alimony award, did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding Petitioner's impending 
retirement was not a substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time 
of the divorce? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute and two cases dispose of the issue outlined above: Section 30-3-
5(7)(g)(i) (1998 and Supp. 2001); Bolliger v. Bolliger 997 P.2d 903 (Utah App. 2000); Johnson 
v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001) gives the trial court "continuing jurisdiction 
to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based upon a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce." 
"The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been a substantial 
change of circumstances is presumed valid." Bolliger v. Bolliger 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
App. 2000). The Appellate Court reviews "the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard." 
Id-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to modify an alimony award. The 
alimony award had been granted in a divorce decree twelve years earlier. The case arose in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The parties were 
husband and wife but were divorced pursuant to a decree entered in 1989. Ten years later, 
because Petitioner was reaching retirement age, he brought a petition to modify the alimony 
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award on the grounds that his impending retirement was a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the lime of the divorce The case was tried before the bench 
on April 17, 2001. The trial court rendered its decision on the record and, on May 18, 2001, 
entei eci the Oi dei Dei lyii lg Petition to Modify. 
The trial court denied the petition because: 
[T]he rule that Judge Rigtrup [the judge who entered the divorce decree] made 
in the original divorce decree certainly contemplates retirement. If it didn't, 
[Respondent] would not have been awarded a percentage of [Petitioner's] 
retirement. At the same time, it awards alimony that goes past age 65. That's 
clear, too. So I would surmise that Judge Rigtrup meant that the alimony 
payment should go on [sic] retirement. Judge Rigtrup obviously understood that 
Ms. Adamson was going to be totally unproductive. When the court says you 
can take the child support out of the equity in the home, that's a recognition that 
the person who should be the payer of the child support is never going to pay. 
Record, at 53, lii ies 5 16. 
Although the trial court found no substantial material change in circumstances, it went 
on to find that Respondent would be better off if alimony, in fact, were terminated. The trial 
court stated: 
[A]t the same time, if because of this ruling, [Petitioner] decides not to retire, 
then I think [Respondent] ought to initiate discussions to figure out a way to 
trade his retirement and the percentage he gets for the alimony that she's 
receiving, because as I've said, even though my ruling is that there is not a 
change in circumstances to warrant changing the alimony award in the petition, 
[Respondent] would be better off if there was. So (inaudible) ruling very much. 
It's sort of an unsatisfactory situation. 
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor -
THE COURT: I'm not over. I'm saying he should... he ought to be able to retire. 
I'm not ordering him to retire, and he can work as long as the 
State would let him work, and she'd be better off if he'd retire and 
she gave up the alimony. 
Record, at 53, lines 22-25, and at 54, lines 1-10. 
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Petitioner now brings this appeal. No motions are pending in the trial court pursuant 
Rules 50(a), 50(b), 52(b), 54(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action were husband and wife, but were divorced by a decree of 
divorce entered by the original trial court on February 9, 1989. See Exhibit "C." Effective 
beginning the date the decree was entered, the original trial court awarded Respondent 
$200.00 per month in alimony. Decree of Divorce at para. 11. The entire reference to 
alimony contained in the Findings of Fact reads as follows: 
Both parties to this action are able-bodied and employable. However, 
Defendant [Respondent] is in need of support. It is reasonable, just and proper 
that Plaintiff [Petitioner] be ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of Two 
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, commencing with the 
month of February 1989, and continuing until the death of the Plaintiff or 
Defendant, or until Defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first 
occurs, or until further order of this court. This award of alimony is subject to 
review by the court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. before the assigned judge. 
Findings of Fact at para. 13. The alimony award did not change. 
The original trial court also divided Petitioner's retirement benefits. The entire 
reference to retirement benefits contained in the Findings of Fact reads as follows: 
Plaintiff has acquired an interest in a retirement plan through his employment 
with the State of Utah, which should be divided equally between the parties, 
according to the Woodward Formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
should issue from this Court. 
Findings of Fact at para. 12. 
Petitioner brought his petition to modify because he was reaching retirement age and 
wanted to retire. By the time of trial, he had reached retirement age. The trial court found: 
The Petitioner was 65 years of age at the time of trial in this action and will 
achieve the age of 66 years within approximately one month from the date of 
trial herein. 
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Order Denying Petition at para. 8. 
Based upon the courts observations of the Petitioner at trial, his demeanor and 
appearance, and based upon this court's finding that there is a cultural 
expectation in our society that persons can retire from full-time employment at 
the age of 65, the court finds that it is reasonable, just and proper that the 
Petitioner retire at this time. 
id. 
Despite being of retirement age and wishing to retire, Petitioner had not retired 
because he could not afford to both retire and contim le to pay alimony to Respondent. The 
trial court found: 
The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his eligibility 
to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay alimony 
will continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to 
meet his expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony 
obligation continues. This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for bringing his 
petition to modify the alimony obligation to terminate that obligation. 
Id. 
Even though the trial court did not find Petitioner's impending retirement was a 
substantial n latei ial cl iai ige in circi imstances, the trial court did enter numerous findings of fact 
concerning Respondent's needs and Petitioner's ability to pay. See Order Denying Petition at 
paras 11-19. The trial court included among its findings, calculations of the income 
Respondent would receive from Social Security benefits to whicl i si le was entitled already, but 
for which she had not yet applied; and calculations of the income Respondent would receive 
from Petitioner's retirement, if F * did, in fact, retire. Id. Given the much more favorable 
financial situation Respondent would realize if Petitioner retired, the trial court concluded: 
The Respondents refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in order to 
induce the Petitioner to retire, so that she can receive his retirement benefits 
which are greater than the alimony, is not reasonable in the premises. 
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However, the court cannot require the parties to behave reasonably in 
settlement discussions. 
]d. at 20. On the record at the conclusion of trial, the trial court insisted Respondent would be 
better off if Petitioner retired and stopped paying alimony. The trial court stated: 
[Respondent's] better off if [Petitioner] retires, though. [Petitioner's counsel] is 
right. [Respondent] is going to qualify for social security, and that's going to 
happen whether he retires or not, but her percentage of his retirement should be 
close to two-and-a-half, three times the amount of alimony that she receives 
under the alimony [sic]. So, if I show that they haven't shown a material change 
in circumstances and the Petition is denied, and he chooses to continue working 
because of that, she's in worse shape than she is if he retires, even if I say he 
doesn't have to pay alimony anymore. The numbers can't be argued with. 
Record at 51, lines 5-14. 
As stated above, the court did find that Petitioner had not shown a material change in 
circumstances. The trial court denied Petitioner's petition for the following reasons: 
[T]he rule that Judge Rigtrup made in the original divorce decree certainly 
contemplates retirement. If it didn't, [Respondent] would not have been 
awarded a percentage of [Petitioner's] retirement. At the same time, it awards 
alimony that goes past age 65. That's clear, too. So I would surmise that Judge 
Rigtrup meant that the alimony payment should go on [sic] retirement. 
Record, at 53, lines 5-16. Regarding the trial court's reasons for denying the petition, the 
single finding of fact that addresses the trial court's reasons states: 
The [original trail court] did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon 
the Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's death 
or Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this, this court 
concludes that the trial court originally did not intend alimony ever to terminate. 
Order Denying Petition to Modify at para. 23. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner brought a petition to modify the alimony award contained in his divorce 
decree. Petitioner sought the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify the alimony award on the 
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grounds that his impending retirement was a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. He requested that the trial court terminate his obligation 
to pay alimony. However, the trial court denied Petitioner's petition to terminate alimony. 
The trial court found that Petitioner's impending retirement was not a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Specifically, the 
trial court found that the original trial court, the court which entered the decree, had foreseen 
Petitioner's retirement in making the original alimony award. The trial court based its 
conclusion on two facts: first, the original trial court had awarded permanent alimony which 
would continue beyond Petitioner's attaining the age of 65; and second, the original trial court 
had divided Petitioner's retirement benefits between the parties. From these two facts, the trial 
court concluded that the original trial court must have foreseen Petitioner's retirement. 
Apparently, to the trial court, because the original trial court ordered "permanent 
alimony," it had to have foreseen Petitioner's retirement. If the original trial court had intended 
alimony ever to end, it would not have entered an alimony award that continued indefinitely, 
beyond Petitioner's attaining the age of 65, and ending only when a party died or remarried. 
Additionally, the original trial court must have foreseen Petitioner's retirement because, if the 
original trial court had not foreseen Petitioner's retirement, it could not have divided Petitioner's 
retirement benefits. The original trial court divided the retirement benefits; therefore, the 
original trial court must have foreseen Petitioner's retirement at the time of the divorce. 
Given these two facts, the original trial court foresaw Petitioner's retirement at the time 
of the divorce, the current trial court believed it could not regard Petitioner's attainment of 
retirement age, his intention to retire, and his loss of income resulting from his proposed 
retirement as a substantial material changes in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of 
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the divorce. Consequently, the trial court denied Petitioner's petition. However, the trial court 
abused its discretion when it found that the bare award of permanent alimony, and the simple 
fact of allocating a retirement benefit, indicated that the original trial court foresaw Petitioner's 
retirement at the time of divorce. 
Two cases from the Court of Appeals are directly on point in holding that the 
foreseeability of a parties' retirement, in the sense that the original trial court considered 
retirement in making its alimony award, cannot be inferred from the two facts stated above. 
Bolliger v. Bolliger 997 P.2d 903 (Utah App. 2000), held that a trial court, knowing only that an 
award of alimony was permanent, could not infer that, at the time of divorce, the original trial 
court contemplated a parties' retirement in making its alimony award. See Id. at 908. In 
addition, concerning whether a trial court made adequate findings that it foresaw a parties' 
retirement in making an original alimony award, Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 
1993), held that a trial court, in simply allocating retirement benefits between the parties, did 
not make sufficient findings to inform a later trial court, when faced with a petition to modify, 
whether the original trial court considered retirement in its alimony award or not. The court in 
Johnson further held it to be against public policy to have trial courts, on petition's to modify 
brought years after the fact, trying to divine what, in making their alimony awards, original trial 
court's did or did not contemplate years earlier, id. at 253. 
Finally, because the trial court found that Respondent would be better off if Petitioner 
retired and alimony were terminated, it is not necessary to remand this case to the trial court 
for further findings regarding an alimony award. This Court should find Petitioner's retirement 
to be a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce; 
and this Court should terminate Petitioner's alimony obligation. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY BECAUSE PETITIONER'S 
PENDING RETIREMENT WAS A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CHANGE 
OF CIRCUMSTANCES NOT FORESEEN AT THE TIME OF THE 
PARTIES' DIVORCE. 
Petitioner was almost 66 years old when Petitioner's petition to modify came to trial. 
The decree of divorce was then twelve years old. Based upon its assessment of Petitioner, 
personally, and based upon a general finding that people expect to retire at age 65, the court 
found it to be "reasonable, just and proper" that Petitioner retire. Order Denying Petition at 
para. 9. The trial court further found that Petitioner's income would be reduced if he retired, 
and that he could not afford to retire if his obligation to pay alimony continued. Id. at 16. 
Despite this, the trial court concluded Petitioner's retirement was not a substantial material 
change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce. Record, at 54, lines 1-5. 
Instead, the trial court found that the original trial court, which made the alimony award in 
1989, did foresee Petitioner's retirement. Record, at 53, lines 5-6. 
The trial court has continuing jurisdiction over alimony awards. However, in order to 
invoke the court's continuing jurisdiction, a petitioner must show there has been a substantial 
material change of circumstance not foreseeable at the time of divorce. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i), Utah 
Code Ann. (1998 & Supp. 2001) (which provides "the court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material 
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce"). Id. 
In the instant case, the trial court found that because the original trial court 
contemplated Petitioner's retirement, Petitioner's retirement was foreseeable at the time of 
divorce. Thus, the court concluded it could not make a new order terminating alimony. 
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In the instant case, the trial court found that because the original trial court 
contemplated Petitioner's retirement, Petitioner's retirement was foreseeable at the time of 
divorce. Thus, the court concluded it could not make a new order terminating alimony. 
This Court reviews the trial court's determination whether there has not been a 
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Bolliger v. Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah App. 2000); 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding Petitioner's retirement was an event 
foreseeable, or contemplated, at the time of the parties' divorce. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding that, Simply 
Because the Divorce Decree Made a "Permanent Alimony" Award, 
Which Did Not Specify a Particular Termination Date, the Divorce 
Decree Contemplated Petitioner's Retirement. 
The trial court based its finding of foreseeability on the fact that the original trial court 
awarded "permanent alimony." The alimony award contained in the decree of divorce 
continued beyond Petitioner's attaining the age of 65. In fact, it continued on, through time, 
terminating only when one or the other party died or remarried. Record, at 53, lines 5-16. 
From the mere "permanency" of the alimony award, the trial court concluded that the original 
trial court intended alimony to continue beyond Petitioner's retirement; and, thus, the original 
trial court foresaw Petitioner's retirement in making its alimony award. 
The Bolliger case is directly on point. 997 P.2d 903. In Bolliger the parties divorced 
pursuant to a decree entered in 1987. Under the decree, Mrs. Bolliger was awarded $685 per 
month alimony from April 1987, onward, and she was awarded one-half of the military pension 
Mr. Bolliger was then receiving. The alimony award would be payable to Mrs. Bolliger "so long 
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as she lives with the exception that [it would] cease upon [Mrs. Bolliger's] remarriage, 
cohabitation, or death." Bolliger, 997 P.2d at 905. It is interesting to note that both the 
Bolliger case and the instant case come from the same court and the same trial judge. 
In 1997, ten years after the entry of the divorce decree, Mr. Bolliger petitioned the court 
to modify the alimony award because he faced unexpected retirement from his job, and 
because Mrs. Bolliger had begun receiving social security. Mr. Bolliger argued that neither of 
these events, not his forced retirement nor Mrs. Bolliger's receipt of social security, were 
anticipated by the divorce decree or were considered in calculating the amount of Mrs. 
Bolliger's alimony award. Mrs. Bolliger argued that both events were anticipated by the divorce 
decree. Id. at 906. 
The trial court found that Mr. Bolliger's retirement and Mrs. Bolliger's receipt of social 
security, and the changes these may bring about, were foreseeable events. And, like the trial 
court in the instant case, the Bolliger trial court found that the parties' agreement to a 
permanent alimony award evinced the foreseeability both of Mr. Bolliger's retirement and of 
Mrs. Bolliger's receipt of social security. Id. at 908. 
In holding that the Bolliger trial court had abused its discretion in finding the events 
foreseeable or contemplated, the Court of Appeals reiterated its former articulation of what is 
meant by "contemplated" in a divorce decree. The court said: 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial material change in 
circumstances] in their own minds or in their discussions does not mean that the 
decree itself contemplates the change. In order for a material change in 
circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, 
preferably in the form of a provision in the decree itself, that the trial court 
anticipated the specific change. Id. at 906 (quoting Durfee vs. Durfee, 796 P.2d 
713, 716 (Utah App. 1990). Id. at 906. 
The Bolliger court continued: 
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Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any 
reference to the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to modify, then 
the subsequent changed circumstances was not contemplated in the original 
divorce decree. Id. (Emphasis added). 
The Bolliger court concluded, based upon its review of precedent, that "a party's 
retirement or receipt of social security, unless expressly foreseen at the time of the divorce, 
may amount to a substantial and material change of circumstances entitling a petitioner to a 
determination of whether the alimony should be modified." Id. at 908. The Bolliger court held 
that "[Mr. Bolliger's] forced retirement and resulting income reduction and [Mrs. Bolliger's] 
receipt of social security benefits were substantial material changes of circumstances not 
foreseen at the time of divorce. Thus the [Bolliger] trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied [Mr. Bolliger's] Petition to Modify Alimony on that basis." Id. 
Like the trial court in the instant case, the Bolliger trial court found evidence of the 
foreseeability of retirement and social security in the permanent nature of the alimony award. 
The Court of Appeals in Bolliger assumed the Bolliger trial court determined "neither the parties 
nor the court could modify a permanent alimony award." However, "even if permanent alimony 
is awarded, a later material change of circumstances not foreseen at the time of divorce can 
provide grounds for modifying the permanent alimony upon appropriate petition." Id. at 908 
(citing Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah App. 1990)). Consequently, the Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court's denial of Mr. Bolliger's petition to modify on the basis that the 
alimony award was permanent, was an abuse of discretion. Id. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not conclude that permanent alimony could not be 
modified by the court. Instead, the trial court found that the award of "permanent 
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alimony"—continuing, as it did, beyond the date of Petitioner's retirement—expressly indicated 
that the original trial court foresaw these events. Record, at 53, lines 5-11. 
However, the mere permanency of alimony, by itself, does not give any indication that 
the original trial court contemplated retirement at the time of divorce. The court in Bolliger held 
that the Bolliger trial court's reliance on the "permanency" of the alimony award was an abuse 
of discretion. 997 P.2d at 908. The court did not suggest that while a permanent alimony 
award could be modified, still, a trial court might be able to rely on the permanency of the 
award as evidence that the original trial court foresaw a party's retirement. Consequently, the 
instant trial court's reliance on the permanency of the alimony award as justifying the 
foreseeability of Petitioner's retirement was an abuse of discretion. See Id. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding that, Because the 
Divorce Decree Allocated Petitioner's Retirement Benefits, the 
Divorce Decree Contemplated Petitioner's Retirement. 
The second reason the trial court gave not finding Petitioner's retirement to be a 
substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce was that 
the divorce decree allocated Petitioner's retirement benefits. Because retirement was 
mentioned in the decree, the court below concluded the original trial court must have 
contemplated Petitioner's eventual retirement. Record, at 53, lines 6-8. 
Regarding this finding, Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993) is on point. 
In that case, the trial court awarded one-half of the parties' pension plan to each party. This 
particular award was not part of an earlier appeal, therefore, the award remained in force for a 
second appeal of the case. The parties first had appealed the trial court's property division, 
child support, and alimony awards for entry of adequate findings. Upon entry of the court's 
alimony findings, Respondent appealed two particulars of the alimony award. Id. at 251. 
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Even though the trial court allocated the parties' retirement benefits, Mr. Johnson 
claimed the trial court abused its discretion by not contemplating in its alimony award the 
retirement benefits Mrs. Johnson would receive in the future. The Johnson court agreed. Id. 
at 251. The Johnson court stated, "[i]n awarding alimony, the trial court made no findings with 
regard to Mrs. Johnson's future ability to withdraw income from the pension plan, and how this 
additional income would affect her financial condition and her ability to provide for her own 
needs." id. at 253. The Johnson court anticipated the instant trial court's argument regarding 
foreseeability. It pointed out: 
Since the trial court in the instant case Uohnson] divided the pension plan 
between the parties, it was cognizant of Mrs. Johnson's ability to receive 
additional income in the future that would alter her financial condition and 
needs. Thus . . . Mrs. Johnson could argue that her receipt of retirement 
benefits was an anticipated event and the trial court considered it when making 
the alimony award. Therefore, Mrs. Johnson's receipt of retirement benefits 
might not be considered a material change of circumstances. Id. 
In refuting this argument the court stated: 
We do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have parties arguing 
years after the fact over what a trial court may or may not have considered 
when making an alimony award, id. 
This is precisely the kind of speculation in which the trial court in the instant case 
indulged. The trial court searched for language which might be construed as expressly 
indicating what the original trial court may have considered in making its alimony award. But, 
the court in Johnson stated that even though the trial court allocated the parties' retirement 
benefits, the trial court "fail[ed] to expressly indicate whether the future retirement benefits 
were considered in making the alimony award." id. at 254. Therefore, the court held the trial 
court's findings to be inadequate and remanded the case back to the trial court for further 
findings, id. Because the trial court's findings in Johnson were inadequate to indicate whether 
14 
the trial court had considered alimony in making its alimony award, a future trial court, ruling on 
a petition to modify alimony, would have insufficient evidence to conclude that the earlier trial 
court had contemplated retirement in its alimony award. See Id. 
Therefore, under Johnson, the original trial court's mere allocation of retirement 
benefits in this case, without an express indication by it that it had considered retirement in 
making its alimony award, did not give the instant trial court sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the original trial court contemplated retirement. Consequently, to the extent that the lower 
court based its foreseeability determination upon the original trial court's allocation of 
retirement benefits, the trial court abused its discretion. See Id. 
Under case law, neither the permanency of alimony nor the allocation of retirement 
benefits provide sufficient express evidence that Petitioner's retirement was foreseen by the 
original trial court. Therefore, because the original trial court did not foresee retirement, and 
did not expressly incorporate into the Decree, its effect on alimony, the trial court abused its 
discretion in not finding Petitioner's retirement to be a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce. 
POINT 2. REMAND IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE, ONCE A 
SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES IS FOUND, 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE TO RECALCULATE 
ALIMONY: ALIMONY SHOULD TERMINATE. 
Once it is determined a substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable 
at the time of divorce has taken place, the trial court must then consider at least the following 
factors in determining alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) 
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to provide income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse 
to provide support; and (iv) the length of the marriage. These factors apply not only to an 
15 
initial award of alimony, but also to a redetermination of alimony during a modification 
proceeding. The trial court must then make findings of fact based on these factors. 997 P.2d 
at 909 (citing Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting §30-3-
5(7)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1998) (original omits other citations)). 
In the instant case, the trial court made numerous findings concerning the factors cited 
above. Chiefly, the trial court found that, if Petitioner were to retire from his employment with 
the State of Utah; and were Respondent to receive social security disability, social security, 
and her portion of the Petitioner's retirement, Respondent would be in a significantly better 
economic position than she is at the present time, in which she receives social security 
disability benefits and alimony from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month. Order 
Denying Petition at para. 15. The court, further, expressly found it to be unreasonable for 
Respondent to refuse to waive alimony in order to induce Petitioner to retire; so that, in turn, 
Respondent could receive her percentage of Petitioner's retirement benefits, and be better off. 
]d. at 20. 
Given these findings, this Court need not remand the issue of alimony to the triaj court 
for its determination of a new alimony award pursuant to the factors. It is appropriate for the 
Court of Appeals in this case to enter an order terminating Petitioner's alimony obligation on 
appeal. To remand would waste the parties' time because the evidence is clear. Remand 
would serve only to delay the obvious result. 
The appellate court can exercise its equitable powers in modification cases to make 
findings of fact. See Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978). In deciding remand is 
unnecessary, this court would be supporting the factual findings of the trial court. 
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In the instant case, had the trial court not abused its discretion, and had it correctly 
found that a substantial material change of circumstances had occurred, based on its findings 
of fact, the trial court would have terminated Petitioner's alimony in order to make Respondent 
"better off." Because the trial court already has made sufficient findings based on the 
evidence, in this case the appellate court is in an equal position with the trial court. As a result, 
the Court of Appeals simply should terminate Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in not finding that Petitioner's retirement was a 
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at time of the parties' divorce. In 
not finding a substantial material change in circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion 
in basing its decision on the fact that the original trial court awarded permanent alimony, and 
on the fact that the original trail court had allocated Petitioner's retirement benefit. However, 
the trial court made findings sufficient to justify terminating the alimony award on appeal. For 
these reasons, this court should reverse the trial court's refusal to invoke the continuing 
jurisdiction of the court to modify alimony; and this court should order the alimony award 
terminated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | / day of April, 2002. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
CQfR^ORON 
CfclNE 
H. JENNINGS 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to be mailed to and one true and correct copy faxed to: 
NATHAN PACE 
Attorney for Respondent 
136 South Main, #404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this \ i day of April, 2002. 
/\ 
Wk XW>0 
Secretary 
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Exhibit "A" 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
RAE ADAMSON, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER DENYING PETITION TO 
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, 
-vs- Civil No. 874904654DA 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
Respondent. 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the court for trial on April 17, 
2001, Petitioner appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record, Mary C. 
Corporon, Respondent appearing in person and by and through her counsel of record, 
Nathan Pace, the court having proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and having 
received the exhibits of the parties, the court having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having reviewed the file and the pleadings contained therein, based thereon and for good 
cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following: 
FIL£3 DISTRICT S0U3T 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Cierk 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties to this action were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in 
the above-entitled case in 1989. 
2. At the time of the divorce of the parties, they had been married for a 
period of time between 17 and 18 years. 
3. At the time of the divorce, the parties were the parents of minor children, 
all of whom have now achieved their majority. However, the Petitioner 
testified and the court finds that the Petitioner has an adult son residing 
with him, and that the Petitioner is supporting the youngest child of these 
two parties in serving a religious mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Petitioner was 
awarded custody of the parties' children, subject to Respondent's rights of 
visitation. The Respondent was ordered to pay child support for the 
parties' children of $75.00 per month per child, and the court, within the 
—decree of divorce, specifically awarded Respondent an interest in the 
marital residence, but provided that her child support obligation would be 
set off against her home equity. The court now finds that the trial court's 
prior determination to allow a set-off of child support against home equity 
constituted a finding by the court in the initial proceedings herein that the 
n 
Respondent could not be relied upon to pay support regularly to the 
parties' children. 
4. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Respondent was awarded alimony 
from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month. The Petitioner failed 
to pay any of his alimony timely, and a judgment for alimony arrearages 
was previously entered against him in the above-entitled court, in the sum 
of $16,900.00. The Petitioner paid that to Respondent in a lump sum to 
satisfy this judgment early in the year 2000. Respondent has testified and 
the court finds that the Respondent has expended the entirety of the lump 
sum payment for these alimony arrearages in repaying a loan to her 
brother and, in paying her utilities and her usual and routine living 
expenses. 
5. The Respondent did not pay any of her child support to the Petitioner, 
and eventually the entire amount of her child support was withheld from 
-__:her equitable lien in the marital residence. As a result thereof, the 
Respondent's equitable lien in the residence was extinguished, and 
Respondent has no remaining interest in the equity in the marital 
residence. 
J 
6. The court finds that each party has been a "deadbeat," to some extent, 
the Petitioner for failure to pay alimony timely as previously ordered - the 
Respondent for failure to pay child support for the parties' minor children 
during their minority when they were in need of actual support. 
7. The court ordered the Petitioner to be taken into a holding cell to show 
him what the court can do with men who refuse to obey court orders. 
8. The Petitioner was 65 years of age at the time of trial in this action and 
will achieve the age of 66 years within approximately one month from the 
date of trial herein. 
9. Based upon the court's observations of the Petitioner at trial, his 
demeanor and appearance, and based upon this court's finding that there 
is a cultural expectation in our society that persons can retire from full-
time employment at the age of 65, the court finds that it is reasonable, just 
and proper that the Petitioner retire at this time. 
10. -_The Respondent herein is 58 years of age. The Respondent is not 
currently employed and has not been employed at all since the entry of 
the decree of divorce herein. The Respondent testified and the court 
finds that the Respondent did not ever make any application for any 
employment since the entry of the decree of divorce, as previously 
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ordered by the court. The Respondent has testified that she did not make 
application for employment because of her disability. The court finds that 
she has not endeavored to improve her situation. The court finds 
Respondent could have done so, if she had tried and if she had wanted 
to. 
11. The Respondent receives Social Security Disability benefits in the sum of 
$530.00 per month. The Respondent testified that she did not receive 
any other income from any other source, including food stamps or public 
assistance. However, the Respondent does receive the benefit of public 
housing, and her rent for her apartment is approximately $87.00 per 
month after the subsidy, for an apartment usually renting for $500.00 per 
month. 
12. The Respondent has reasonable and necessary living expenses, in 
addition to $87.00 per month for rent, of $150.00 per month for utilities, 
$250.00 per month for food and household supplies, and that she is 
entitled to incur reasonable expenses for such things as clothing or 
transportation. The Respondent does not have a motor vehicle nor does 
she have a telephone. She testified to the court from the witness stand 
that she is physically able to ride the city bus. 
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13. The Respondent was married to the Petitioner for a period of time in 
excess of 10 years and the Petitioner has now achieved the age of 65. 
Accordingly, the court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to obtain Social 
Security retirement benefits from the Social Security Administration, 
based upon the Petitioner's receiving Social Security retirement benefits. 
However, the Respondent has failed to make application for these 
benefits. The court finds that, were she to apply for Social Security 
retirement benefits, those benefits would be received by her in the sum of 
approximately $500.00 to $700.00 per month. 
14. The Respondent is entitled to receive a portion of the Petitioner's 
retirement benefits, based upon her marriage to the Petitioner during a 
period of time when he was also employed by his current employer, the 
State of Utah. The court finds that, therefore, the Respondent would be 
entitled to receive approximately 25% of the actual retirement benefit 
awarded to the Petitioner, or approximately $6,500.00 per year or 
$541.66 per month, upon the Petitioner's retirement from full-time 
employment. 
15. The court finds that, were the Petitioner to retire from his employment with 
the State of Utah and were Respondent to receive Social Security 
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retirement benefits and her portion of the Petitioner's retirement, the 
Respondent would be in a significantly better economic position than she 
is at the present time, receiving Social Security disability benefits and 
alimony from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month. 
16. The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his 
eligibility to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation 
to pay alimony will continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that 
he will be unable to meet his expenses on a reduced income from 
retirement, if the alimony obligation continues. This was the Petitioner's 
stated purpose for bringing his petition to modify the alimony obligation to 
terminate that obligation. 
17. The Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah Division of Child and 
Family Services as a social worker. His gross annual income is 
approximately $40,000.00, or $3,333.33 per month. From this is withheld 
-jederal and state taxes of approximately $848.00, and his net income is 
$2,485.33 per month. 
18. In addition to the foregoing income from his employment, the Petitioner 
has requested and has begun to receive Social Security retirement 
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benefits by reason of his having achieved his 65th birthday, and those 
benefits are paid to him in the sum of approximately $1,250.00 per month. 
19. The Petitioner has reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses as 
follows: 
Rent/Mortgage: 
Property Taxes: 
Insurance: 
Maintenance: 
Food/Supplies: 
Utilities (water/gas^ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
f 
electric/heat: $ 
Telephone: $ 
Laundry/Dry Clean: $ 
Clothing: $ 
Medical and Dental $ 
Medical Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Union Dues 
Entertainment: 
Incidentals: 
Auto expenses: 
Installments: 
Other expenses: 
Other expenses: 
Attorney's fees: 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
400.00 to amortize the loan or $280.00 to pay 
interest only. 
110.00 
45.00 
100.00 
460.00 
150.00 
55.00 
10.00 
50.00 
125.00 
30.00 
35.00 
14.00 
100.00 
100.00 
250.00 
$1,176.00 
$ 
$ 
$ 
200.00 (alimony) 
380.00 (missionary cost for son on mission) 
150.00 
TOTAL EXPENSES: $3,940.00 
20. The Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in order to 
induce the Petitioner to retire, so that she can receive his retirement 
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benefits, which are greater than the alimony, is not reasonable in the 
premises. However, the court cannot require the parties to behave 
reasonably in settlement discussions. 
21. Each party to this action has incurred substantial attorney's fees, and 
each party should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in this action. 
22. Petitioner has requested that this court order that alimony terminate after 
the duration of the parties' marriage, given the adoption of new statutory 
law generally limiting the duration of alimony to the length of a marriage. 
The court declined to grant this request. 
23. The court did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon the 
Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's 
death or Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this, 
this court concludes that the trial court originally did not intend alimony 
-_ever to terminate. 
BASED UPON the foregoing and for good cause appearing the court now makes 
and enters the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter to this action and over 
the parties to this action. 
2. There has not been a substantial and material change in circumstances 
warranting a modification of alimony. 
3. The Petitioner does not come to this court with clean hands, and is 
therefore not entitled to the relief which he is seeking. 
4. The court should not modify the duration of the alimony, to terminate after 
the duration of the parties' marriage. 
ORDER 
BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and for good 
cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
The Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce is hereby dismissed, 
each party tapay and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
this action. 
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DATED THIS 18 day of l/Ufze*^' , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
STEPHEN L. HEN 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed to: 
NATHAN PACE 
Attorney for Respondent 
136 South Main, #404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this / day of 2001. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
RAE ADAMSON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- Civil No. D87-4654 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February, 
1989, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; the 
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C. 
Corporon, and the defendant appearing in person and by and 
through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the 
sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and more than 90 days having 
elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, the 
Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are now, and were for a period 
of three months or more immediately prior to the filing of the 
Complaint in this action, residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. The parties to this action are husband and wife, having 
been married on April 17, 1970. 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties, making continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. There have been two children born as issue of this 
marriage, namely: Shandrae, age 15, and Tracy, age 8. Plaintiff 
is a fit and proper person to be awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of said minor children, subject to 
defendant's rights of visitation. 
5. Defendant should be awarded visitation weekly with the 
minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged 
directly between the defendant and the parties' children. The 
Court recommends that this visitation occur either on a Saturday 
or on a Sunday. In addition, defendant should have visitation 
with the minor children on alternate state and federal holidays, 
on her birthday, and on the children's birthday, as she may 
arrange between herself and the children. Further, defendant 
should have reasonable and liberal telephone access with the 
minor children. The defendant's visitation with the children 
should be unsupervised; however, in the event that the defendant 
should be intoxicated at the commencement of the visitation or 
become so during the course of the visitation, then the children 
need not remain for the balance of the visitation. 
6. Plaintiff should be ordered to maintain health and 
accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children 
of the parties, as it is available to him through his employment. 
7. It is reasonable, just and proper that the entire 
family, including plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor 
children, be ordered, to submit to counseling with a qualified 
family therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health, 
the Utah State Department of Social Services, or another 
qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the 
conflict between the defendant and the minor children of the 
parties. 
8. The parties have acquired an interest in a pickup truck 
and a Ford automobile, which the Court finds to be of relatively 
equal value, with no indebtedness owing on either. Plaintiff 
should be awarded the truck, free and clear of any interest of 
the defendant and the Ford Granada should be awarded to the 
defendant free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. 
9. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
incurred various debts and obligations. Plaintiff should be 
ordered to pay and assume all debts and obligations incurred by 
the parties until the date of the divorce herein, including, 
specifically, any debt incurred by defendant for her living 
accommodations. 
10. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and 
belongings, and household furnishings, fixtures and appliances. 
Defendant should be awarded the grandfather clock, one set of 
bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of the 
tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual table 
and chairs as her sole and separate property, free and clear of 
any interest of the plaintiff. Other than as set forth herein, 
the parties' previous division of their items of personalty and 
furniture, fixtures and appliances should be confirmed each and 
each party should be awarded those items currently in his or her 
possession. 
11. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired an interest in certain real property located in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, commonly known as 4195 South 1865 
East. Plaintiff should be awarded the permanent use and 
possession of said real property, and all right, title and 
interest therein, including the right to any reserve account, 
free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject to the 
first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon, which 
plaintiff should be ordered to pay and assume and hold defendant 
harmless thereon, and defendant should be ordered to execute a 
Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may have in said 
real property to the plaintixf W Defendant should be awarded an 
equitable lien on said real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00), representing her one-half share of the 
equity in the real property, said lien to be non-interest-bearing 
and to become payable to defendant on the first to occur of the 
following events: 
a. plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home 
with a woman other than the defendant; 
b. the youngest child of the parties attaining the age 
of 18 years or graduating from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
A 
d. the sale of the real property at plaintiff's 
election; 
e. plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as 
his primary place of residence. 
12. Plaintiff has acquired an interest in a retirement plan 
through his employment with the State of Utah, which should be 
divided equally between the parties, according to the Woodward 
formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should issue 
from this Court. 
13. Both parties to this action are able-bodied and 
employable. However, defendant is in need of support. It is 
reasonable, just and proper that plaintiff be ordered to pay to 
defendant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as 
and for alimony, commencing with the month of February 1989, and 
continuing until the death of the plaintiff or defendant, or 
until defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first 
occurs, or until further order of this Court. This award of 
alimony is subject to review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 
8:30 a.m., before the assigned judge. 
14. Defendant should be ordered to pursue all employment 
opportunities and all job training opportunities available to 
her, including, but not limited to, making application for 
assistance with the following: the Phoenix Institute, Job 
Service, Utah State Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, the 
Utah State Department of Social Services and colleges and 
universities in the Salt Lake area for a PELL grant. Further, 
defendant should be ordered to make a reasonable and concerted 
effort to obtain employment, including making contacts through 
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of 
three applications for employment per week with prospective 
employers. Defendant should be ordered to report her job search 
efforts to this Court at the hearing on July 7, 1989. 
15. It is reasonable, just and proper that the Court impute 
a minimum wage income earning capability to the defendant in 
assessing the defendant's obligation for child support. The 
Court does so, and imputes to defendant the ability to earn 
income in the gross sum of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per 
month. Further, the Court finds that the plaintiff's gross 
monthly income is in the sum of Two Thousand One Hundred Ten 
Dollars ($2,110.00) per month. Based upon these income figures, 
the Court calculates defendant's child support obligation to be 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing 
with the month of February 1989 and continuing until such time as 
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from 
high school in the normal course of their high school educations, 
whichever event occurs later. In any month when the defendant 
fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child 
support, the child support shall be deducted from defendant's 
lien upon the marital residence of the parties. 
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears 
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff should be entitled 
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988). 
16. It is reasonable, just and proper that each party pay 
and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees. 
17. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this 
action and over the subject matter of this action. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the 
defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between the parties, the same to become final and effective 
immediately upon being signed by the Judge and entered by the 
Clerk in the register of actions. 
3. The Decree of Divorce granted to plaintiff should be in 
conformance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED THIS %6 ^day of r\cji*e£i , 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
w%£ fM 
i t l ( J T 
KENNETH RIGTRUP U 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to be served upon defendant by placing a true and correct 
copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
JEFFREY C. HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant 
225 South 200 East 
Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the ,-A/> day of February, 1989. 
A
 ( / ( s? 
,JIALJC^ •/< . ^'fi/.u<r>n< 
Secretary 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COJRT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
RAE ADAMSON, ~ J ^ 1 ^ 
Plaintiff, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
-vs- Civil No. D87-4654 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February^ 
1989, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; the 
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C. 
Corporon, and the defendant appearing in person and by and 
through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the 
sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and more than 90 days having 
elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, and the 
Court and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintirf is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
being signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties, Shandrae and 
Tracy* 
3. Defendant is hereby awarded visitation weekly witli the 
minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged 
directly between the defendant and the parties' children, taking 
into consideration the Court's recommendation that this 
visitation occur either on a Saturday or on a Sunday. In 
addition, defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children 
on alternate state and federal holidays, on her birthday, and on 
the children's birthd .y, as she may arrange between herself and 
the children. Further, defendant is awarded reasonable and 
liberal telephone access with the minor children. The 
defendant's visitation with the children shall be unsupervised; 
however, in the event that the defendant should be intoxicated at 
the commencement of the visitation or become so during the course 
of the visitation, the children shall not be required to visit 
with x.he defendant on that occasion, 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and accident 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children of the 
parties, as it is available to him through his employment. 
5. Plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor children, 
are hereby ordered tp submit to counseling with a qualified 
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family therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health, 
the Utah State Department of Social Services, or another 
qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the 
conflict between the defendant and the minor children of the 
parties. 
6. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the truck, free and clear of 
any interest of the defendant and defendant is hereby awarded the 
Ford Granada, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to pay and assume all debts and 
obligations incurred by che parties until the date of the divorce 
herein, including, specifically, any debt incurred by defendant 
for her living accommodations. 
8. T.'ie parties' previous division of their items of 
personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belcngings, and household 
furnishings, fixtures and appliances is hereby confirmed in each 
and each party is awarded those items currently in his or her own 
possession, with the exception of the following items, which are 
hereby awarded to the defendant: the grandfather clock, one set 
of bathroom linons, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of 
the tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual 
table and chairs. 
9. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent use rsnd 
possession of the real property of the parties located at 4195 
South 1865 East in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and all right, 
title and interest therein, including the right to any reserve 
account, frse and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject 
to *ue first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon, 
which plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay and assume and hold 
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defendant harmless thereon. Defendant is hereby ordered to 
execute a Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may 
have in said real property to the plaintiffJ Further, defendant 
is hereby awarded a non-interest bearing equitable lien on said 
real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), 
representing her one-half share of the equity in the real 
property, payable upon the first to occur of the following 
events: 
a. plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home 
with woman other than the defendant; 
b. the youngest child of the parties attaining the age 
of 18 years or graduating from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
d. the sale of the real property at plaintiff's 
election; 
e. plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as 
his primary place of residence, 
10, Plaintiff's retirement plan through his employment with 
the State of Utah, is ordered to be divided between the parties, 
according to the Woodward formula, and a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order shall issue from this Court. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant the sum 
of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, 
commencing with the month of February 1989, and continuing until 
the death of the plaintiff or defendant, until defendant's 
remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until 
further order of this Court. This award of alimony is subject to 
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review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m., before the 
assigned judge. 
12. Defendant is hereby ordered to pursue all employment 
opportunities and all job training opportunities available to her 
as set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by this Court. 
Further, defendant is ordered to make a reasonable and concerted 
effort to obtain employment, including making contacts through 
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of 
three applications for employment per week with prospective 
employers and is ordered to report her job search efforts to this 
Court at the hearing on July 7, 1989. 
13. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum 
of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing 
with the month of February 1989 and continuing until such time as 
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from 
high school in the normal course of their high school educations, 
whichever event occurs later. In any month when the defendant 
fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child 
support, said child support shall be deducted from defendant's 
lien on the marital residence of the parties. 
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears 
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled 
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988). 
14. Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own 
court costs and attorney's fees. 
15. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
